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Streaming Estimation of Information-theoretic
Metrics for Anomaly Detection (Extended
Abstract)
Sergey Bratus1, Joshua Brody, David Kotz, and Anna Shubina
Dartmouth College, NH 03755, USA
Abstract. Information-theoretic metrics hold great promise for modeling
traffic and detecting anomalies if only they could be computed in an efficient,
scalable ways. Recent advances in streaming estimation algorithms give hope
that such computations can be made practical. We describe our work in
progress that aims to use streaming algorithms on 802.11a/b/g link layer
(and above) features and feature pairs to detect anomalies.
Information-theoretic statistics applied to monitoring of network traffic can
be very useful in detecting changes in its character [6, 4, 3]. These metrics make few
modeling assumptions about what constitutes normal and abnormal traffic (e.g., [2]),
and thus, theoretically, should do very well at adapting to the traffic characteristics
of a specific networks, realizing the “home network advantage” of prior knowledge
that defenders have over outside attackers.
However, necessary computations place a heavy load on both the sensor CPU
and RAM. Thus scalability of methods that rely on precise real-time computations
of entropy and other related statistics remains a challenge. Luckily, a new class
of streaming algorithms produce practically usable estimated results with much
smaller requirements to CPU and RAM ([5, 1]). They have the potential to allow
information-theoretics metrics to be scalably used in practice.
Several experimental systems (including Wi-Fi link layer anomaly detectors being
developed at Dartmouth) apply entropy of pre-selected packet or session features to
produce alerts. Such mechanisms rely on the idea that a change in the character of a
feature distribution is suspicious. In our experience, watching a set of features as if
they were independent is highly prone to false positives. A change in the entropy of a
feature may be due to factors such as normal business day and other workflow cycles.
Even the simplest cases of single protocol features require, e.g., some modeling of
when a particular protocol is normally expected to be in use.
Conditional entropy between pairs of features are likely to provide a better metric
of normal use, because it relies on tracking the average “predictability” of one feature
given the knowledge of another. Such relationships are more likely to persist through
diurnal cycles, because they are less related to volumes of traffic.
Unusual use of protocol fields is characteristic of many exploits, but sophisticated
attackers take pains to disguise it, as IDSes might be watching for it. It is much
harder to disguise unusual payloads in such a way that does not introduce unusual
statistical effects in pairs of protocol features. Note that rule-based IDS evasion
techniques themselves (e.g., [7]) can produce just such effects.
Streaming estimation algorithms open up the possibility of a scalable sampling-
based system that allows keeping track of joint distributions, and thus of mutual
information-type statistics. Furthermore, the sampling scheme used in the estima-
tion algorithm can be adjusted dynamically depending on how much precision is
meaningful and practicable for a particular network.
The 802.11a/b/g link layer is feature-rich and complex. It includes large (2346–
2358 bytes) management frames that can contain an entire ring 0 exploit in their
L2 payload alone1. Besides the frame type and subtype fields, the link layer header
may contain 1–4 MAC address fields, 8 bit flags, and 2 16-bit fields, frame sequence
number and duration (the distribution of which has been shown2 to identify wireless
chipset–driver combination as a distinctive fingerprint). The earlier WEP encryption
implementations could be leveraged to leak encryption key bits by responding to
specially crafted injected frames (e.g., the so-called KoreK attack).
Thus this link layer allows a range of interesting attacks and related statistical
distibution anomalies. We distinguish between the four levels of features, based on
the sensor RAM and CPU requirements to follow them: (a) PHY layer errors as cal-
culated and reported by the firmware (b) frequency of basic events, such as observing
deauthentication frames (c) single header field values’ frequency distributions, and
(d) joint and conditional distributions of pairs of features. Anomalies in (a) may
indicate inteference or jamming, (b) serves as good indicators of various DoS-type
flooding and resource consumption attacks, whereas (c) and especially (d) expose
other attacks that involve unusual headers and payloads.
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